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Introduction
In Part I of this article we examined the actual and potential application
of global international law (GIL) to the development of rights and freedoms
for people with disabilities. We concluded that there is currently no binding
and accessible GIL instrument that specifically relates to this group. 1 Instead,
an emphasis was placed upon those instruments that have a generic
application to human rights and a clear potential application to the protection
of disability rights primarily through their provisions relating to non-
discrimination. Moreover, we stressed that the instruments of GIL also have
the potential to provide an indirect benefit to disabled people as tools of
influence and persuasion in the development of non-discrimination and
affirmative action empowerment programmes at both a national and
international level. In Part II, we apply a similar analysis to the opportunities
offered by European international law (ElL).
European International Law (ElL)
The most obvious difference between GIL and ElL is their relative geo-
political spheres of influence. Whilst GIL applies in theory to the entire world,
We would like to acknowledge both fhe patience and editorial skills of Ms Deirdre Waters in
reviewing the many drafts of fhis paper. Any en'ors remain our own.
While lLO Convention 159 concerning vocational rehabilitation and employment (disabled
persons), 1983, specifically relates to people wifh disabilities and is binding upon its Contracting
States, its provisions - like fhat of fhe ofher !LO Conventions - cannot be described as accessible to
the individual or groups of individuals in fhe manner described in Part I of fhis article.
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ElL is limited to those States of Europe that are members of the Council of
Europe and/or the European Union.
A more important difference, however, lies in the relative level of
impact each body of law might have upon the rights and freedoms of disabled
people. In this respect, the continuing legislative and jurisprudential
developments within the Council of Europe and the European Union coupled,
in particular, with the pervasive nature of European Community law, raise the
potential of ElL to bring about positive change for people with disabilities
within the European Region beyond that proffered by the GIL examined in
Part I.
Under the heading ElL, we distinguish between the instruments that
have been developed under the auspices of the Council of Europe and those
emanating from the European Union.
Instruments emanating from the Council of Europe
Independent of the European Community, the Council of Europe
(established in 1948) is an international organisation comprising 40 Member
States. Through its Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly,
the Council of Europe has, in addition to developing the three major binding
instruments (discussed below), passed three non-binding instruments
specifically relating to disability.2 These non-binding instruments provide a
valuable insight into the approach and attitude of the Council ofEurope to this
area of human rights. In particular, Recommendation No R (92) 6 on a
coherent policy for people with disabilities, urges Member States of the
Council of Europe to 'guarantee the right of people with disabilities to an
independent life and full integration into society, and [to] recognise society's
duty to make this possible' so as to ensure 'equality of opportunity' for people
with disabilities. It further provides that to do otherwise would constitute a
See in this respect, Resolution AP (84), adopted on 7 September 1984 by the Committee of
Ministers, on a coherent policyfor the rehabilitation ofhandicapped people; Recommendation No
R (92) 6 adopted 9 April 1992 by the Committee of Ministers on a coherent policy for people with
disabilities, and Recommendation 1185 (1992) adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Emope on 7 May 1992.
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'violation of human dignity'. 3
Perhaps of greater significance, however, are the inferences that one
may draw from such documents to clarifY the possible application of certain
provisions under the binding instruments that have emanated from the Council
of Europe; documents such as the European Social Charters and the European
Convention on Human Rights (discussed below).4 It should be noted that
uncertainties exist both regarding the inclusion of disability within the
protective remit of these instruments and, if included, the nature and extent of
such coverage. In this respect, encouragement may be gained from
Recommendation 1185 (1992) where, in acknowledging the social nature of
disability, it provides:
'A disability is a restriction caused by physical, psychological, sensory,
social, cultural, legal or other obstacles that prevent disabled people
from becoming integrated and taking part in family life and the
community on the same footing as everyone else Society has a duty to
adapt its standards to the specific needs of disabled people in order to
ensure that they can lead independent lives.'
The three binding instruments of the Council of Europe to be reviewed
in this article are as follows:
+ The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 1950
+ The European Social Charter 1961
• The European Social Charter (Revised) 1996
It is interesting to note in this respect that Recommendation 1185 (1992) invites the government of
each Member State to describe what steps have been taken to comply with Recommendation No R
(92)6
In Bolla v Italy, Judgment of 24 February 1998 (15311996/772/973), lor example, the Court of
Human Rights made reference to Recommendation No R (92) 6 of the Committee of Ministers ami
Recommendation 1185 (1992) ibid, while interpreting certain provisions under the European
ConventIOn on Human Rights.
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i. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
1950 (ECHR)
The ECHR came into effect in 1953 and established a binding
international standard ofhuman rights that are primarily civil and political in
nature; rights, therefore, closely mirroring those contained in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR, see Part I). Founded
under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the ECHR places an obligation
on its signatories to ensure that such rights are reflected at a national level and
that a remedy is available from national courts in the event of a breach. In
addition to its binding nature, the ECHR can also be described as accessible
to the individual as each of the Contracting States has voluntarily recognised
the right to individual petition. 5
Be that as it may, the ECHR and its amending Protocols are limited in
at least two respects. The first limitation is that the Convention can only be
enforced against a Contracting State and 'emanations thereof 6 and does not,
therefore, impose any direct obligations upon private individuals or
organisations.? A right of petition, however, is available to State parties,
individuals and groups of individuals provided that the alleged violation
concerns them directly. Unfortunately, representative organisations or
pressure groups that are not directly affected by a State's actions but wish to
litigate on behalf of nameless individuals will not have sufficient standing
under the ECHR. Nevertheless, pressure groups are now regularly given an
opportunity to submit amicus curiae briefs that can provide the Court of
Human Rights with a broader picture against which to assess the details of an
individual's claim.
The second limitation is that, despite the incorporation of the ECHR in
An increase in accessibility will be achieved through the implementation of Protocol No II. This
amendment will reduce the political influence that is cWTently exerted when an application under the
Convention is being considered in terms of its 'admissibility'.
For an examination ofwhat may be considered an emanation of the State under European Community
law, see V Kvjatkoviski, 'What is an Emanation of the State? An Educated Guess', 3 European
Public Law, 1997,3,329. It is submitted that one can draw similar inferences in this respect to the
ECHR and its application.
It should be noted that the protected rights under the Convention can also have an indirect influence
on the rights of individuals in the 'private' sphere; a possibility recently confirmed in Botta v Italy,
infra.
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the majority of Contracting States, there will still be occasions necessitating
application proceedings to the Commission of Human Rights. However, such
an application - which may then be passed on to the Court of Human Rights -
can only take place once all domestic remedies have been exhausted and the
procedure, therefore, to bring an infringing State before the Court of Human
Rights is both time-consuming and expensive. 8
Despite these limitations, the ECHR, its Protocols, and the developing
associated jurisprudence, provide a promising foundation to further advance
the rights and interests of people with disabilities within Contracting States.
While neither the Convention nor its Protocols specifically address questions
pertaining to disability, it is clear that neither do they specifically exclude the
application of disability rights from their consideration9
As regards the right to non-discrimination, the relevant provision under
the ECHR can be found in Article 14. This article lists a number of prohibited
grounds ofdiscrimination and concludes with the words 'or other status', thus:
'The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention
shall be secured without discrimination on any grounds such as sex,
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status [emphasis added].'
The following points should be made in relation to this provision.
Firstly, due to the inclusion of the words 'set forth in this Convention', Article
14, in contrast to Article 26 ICCPR, cannot be pleaded in isolation. It
prohibits discrimination only in respect of one or more of the other rights and
freedoms enshrined within the Convention and cannot, therefore, be described
as 'autonomous'. The extent of this limitation on Article 14 is fully appreciated
when one considers that its lack ofautonomy will prevent the Court of Human
Rights from considering issues relating to non-discrimination if the facts of a
Financial assistance, however, can be sought from the Commission's own financial support facility.
Similarities can be drawn in this respect with the ICCPR and the ICESCR, examined in Part I of this
article.
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given case do not fall within another article's remit of application. 10 It is worth
noting, therefore, that one should not interpret Article 14 as being inherently
inapplicable to people with disabilities merely because the Court of Human
Rights has failed to consider this article in previous cases brought by such
applicants. 11
Secondly, the use of the words 'on any grounds such as' renders Article
14, like Article 26 of the ICCPR (see Part I), 'open-ended' and it therefore
prohibits any distinction on any ground unless 'a reasonable and objective
justification' can be made by the State concerned. Moreover, the indication
from the case law in this respect is that, in assessing the justification made by
the defendant Contracting State, the Court of Human Rights will look to see
whether the distinction is in pursuance ofa 'legitimate aim' and whether or not
there is a 'reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means
employed and the aim sought to be realised'. 12
Thirdly, it is possible that the Court of Human Rights may interpret
Article 14 - and its application - in the same way that it has interpreted Article
8 of the Convention (see below). Such an interpretation would therefore
impose a duty upon Contracting States to introduce positive State action
(distinct from affirmative action measures) to ensure compliance with the
right to non-discrimination. 13 The potential impact of such a duty on the
rights and freedoms of people with disabilities (an impact that may even
extend to the private sphere) has previously been identified in relation to
Article 26 ICCPR (see Part I). It should be noted, however, that due to Article
14's lack of autonomy, such a duty will only apply within the context, or remit
10
11
12
13
See Karheinz Schmidt v Germany judgment of 18 July 1994, Series A no 291-B, p 32, para 22.
This is equal to the position, therefore, in respect of Article 2(2) of the lCESCR. Note that although
the right to non-discrimination in Article 14 has no independent existence, breach of this article can
make unlawful what might otherwise be lawful in terms of the other rights guaranteed by the
Convention; see, for example, Case of Larkos v Cyprus judgment of 18 Febru31Y 1999 (application
no 29515/95), and the Belgian Linguistics case 1 EHRR 252.
One example in this respect is the case of Botta v Italy, examined below.
Gaygusuz v Austria judgment of 16 September 1996 (39/1995/545/631), para 42.
See, for example, Botta v Italy examined below and Airey v Ireland, op cit. A similar interpretation
has been placed upon both the ICCPR and the ICESCR; see in this respect the discussion
surrounding Article 2(2) of the ICCPR and the General Comment No 5 by the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in respect of Article 2(2) of the ICESCR in Part 1 of this
article.
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of application, of the other rights and freedoms protected by the ECHR and
its protocols.
In terms of affirmative action measures, it is unlikely that Article 14
would be interpreted as imposing a positive duty upon the State for the
introduction of such measures that, by their very nature, discriminate in favour
of a protected group. Nevertheless, this would not prevent an acceptance of
affirmative action measures under the Convention as Article 14, like Article
26 ICCPR, will only prohibit State action if it cannot be 'reasonably and
objectively justified'. Given the purpose behind affirmative action measures,
it is difficult to foresee circumstances that would prevent such a justification
being established in defence of State action that favours under-represented
groups; groups that would therefore include people with disabilities.
The inadequacy, however, of non-discrimination provisions such as
Article 14 becomes most salient when one considers that the present
jurisprudence under this Article requires inequality of treatment before
discrimination is said to exist. 14 Thus, a government measure introducing an
employment policy that treats all people equally but fails to compensate for
the existence of disability and, as a result, has an adverse impact on disabled
people, would not fall foul of Article 14 ECHR. It would appear, therefore,
that Article 14 does not demand anything over and above the concept of
'formal equality' and, as a consequence, will be of limited value in combating
'indirect' forms of discrimination; forms constituting the majority of disability
discrimination cases. This apparent limitation is also reflected in the European
Social Charters (see below), and the ICCPR (see Part I). Moreover, with the
exception of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights 1966 (lCESCR, see Part I), doubt also surrounds the relevance of
'reasonable accommodation' to the application of the non-discrimination
principle in these treaties. An announcement, therefore, by the relevant treaty
committees clarifying these issues would clearly be a positive step ill the right
direction. 15
Nonetheless, despite these limitations, a number of articles exist within
14
15
See Obselver and Guardian v UK 14 EHRR 153
It should be noted in this respect that a working group within the Council of Europe is cWTently
revismg the scope of applIcation of At1icle 14 ECHR and it is hoped that its lImitations and
unceltainties. a' identified herein, will be fully addressed in any forthcoming amendments to the non-
discrimination provision.
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the ECHR and its Protocols that would arguably provide the necessary scope
for challenging State practice and laws both independently of, and in
conjunction with, Article 14. Thus, by applying the facts of a recent case in
the United Kingdom, the following discussion aims to demonstrate the
potential of the Convention, its Protocols, and other relevant instruments of
the Council of Europe in both protecting and advancing the rights and
freedoms of people with disabilities.
In ex parte Barry, 16 the House of Lords held by a majority decision that
local authorities may take their resources into consideration when determining
which 'needs' necessitate intervention in respect of the disability support
services listed under s2 of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act
1970 (CSDPA). As a result of this decision, Mr Barry no longer receives
assistance with shopping, laundry, cleaning and collecting his pension. Given
that the absence of such services would make it very difficult for Mr Barry to
remain in his home, one may argue that the cessation of 'community care' has
constructively violated Article 8(1) ECHR, which provides:
'Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence [emphasis added].'
Clarification in respect of Article 8 and its potential application to the
rights and freedoms of disabled people has been provided by a recent decision
of the Court ofHuman Rights. In Botta v Italy,17 a disabled applicant sought
to compel the Italian Government to ensure the realisation of a national law
that would consequently require the removal of the barriers preventing the
applicant from gaining access to a private beach. While the applicant in Botta
was unsuccessful, there are three main elements that can be extracted from
this decision which are relevant to future applications under Article 8 ECHR.
In terms of the first element, the Court reiterated that the meaning of the
words 'private... life' in Article 8 (1) should encompass, inter alia, an
individual's 'physical and psychological integrity'. In the context of ex parte
Barry, therefore, this interpretation would arguably include the ability of an
16
17
R v Gloucestershire County Council. exporte Bony [1997] 2 ALL ER I: [1997] 2 WLR 459 (HL).
Judgment of 24 February 1998 (15311996nn/973).
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individual to be as 'independent' as possible. Such independence would
encourage integration into community and family life and, as a consequence,
playa critical part in an individual's 'physical and psychological integrity'. The
need for independence and its potential impact upon an individual's 'integrity',
and therefore 'private... life', is readily apparent from the issues arising in ex
parte Barry.
Secondly, the Court confirmed that, while primarily intended to protect
the individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities, Article 8(1)
may also impose 'positive obligations inherent in effective respect for private
orfamiZv life'. 18 In the context of ex parte Barry, one may assume that because
the applicant had satisfied the eligibility criteria for disability support services,
the obligation at issue would be the continued provision of those services; a
State obligation, therefore, that is positive in nature.
Thirdly, in striking a fair balance between the general interest and the
interests of the individual, the Court stated that such obligations would only
exist where a direct and immediate link is established between the measures
sought, and the applicant's private and/or family life. On the facts of Botta,
however, it was held that the actual right sought by the applicant,
'... concerned interpersonal relations ofsuch broad and indeterminate
scope that there could be no conceivable direct [and immediateJ link
between the measures which the State was urged to take in order to
make good the omissions of the private bathing establishments and the
applicant's private life19 [emphasis added].'
The direct and immediate link requirement would, therefore, appear to
limit the application of Article 8 (1) both in terms of the 'sphere of human
18
19
Moreover. ti,e Cow1 confmned tilat such obligations may involve tile adoption of measures designed
to secure respect for private life even in tile sphere of the relations between individuals. See also in
tilis respect,X and Yv the Netherlands, 26 March 1985, Series A no 91, p 11, para 23. The latter
concerned the rape of a mentally handicapped person and accordingly related to her physical and
psychological integrity. The offence had occurred while tile applicant was being cared for in tile
prIvate sector.
op cit, para 35. X and Y, ibid, provides a contrast to the reasoning in Batta. It was held inX and
Y tilat tile govemment ofNetilerlands, due to tile shortcomings of the Dutch Criminal Code, had not
afforded the applicant witil practical and effective protection against the offence in question (p 14,
para 30) and, as a result, a direct and immediate link had been established between tile measure
sought by the applicant and her private and/or family life.
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relations' at issue and the extent to which the act or omission in question
'directly affects' the private/family life of the applicant. It is submitted
however that, in the context of Bolta, an overly narrow interpretation was
placed upon this requirement. Such an interpretation is particularly difficult
to accept in light of the definition of disability provided by the Council of
Europe itself in paragraph 3 of Recommendation 1185. This definition clearly
acknowledges the link between obstacles, such as those in Botta, preventing
people with disabilities becoming:
'... integrated and taking part in family life and the community on the
same footing as everyone else',
and therefore creating the disability itself, and society's duty to remove those
obstacles by:
'[adapting] its standards to the specific needs of disabled people in order
to ensure that they can lead independent lives.' 20
Moreover, it is arguable that had the applicant in Botta been denied
access to the beach on the basis of gender or race - grounds classified as
'internationally suspect' - it is unlikely that the Court of Human Rights would
have placed such a restrictive interpretation upon this requirement. This would
suggest, therefore, that either people with disabilities have been accorded a
second-class right to equality under the Convention, or the Court was simply
not aware of the social nature of disability21
Be that as it may, irrespective of the interpretation placed upon the
direct and immediate link requirement, we suggest that the facts of ex parte
Barry clearly satisfY such a link; ie between the measures sought by Mr Barry
(the continuation of care and home help) and the right to respect for his
20
21
A requirement that is also reflected in Recommendation No R (92)6 on a coherent policy for people
with disabilities (discussed above). Moreover Recommendation No R (92)6 clearly provides that
a failure by society to adapt its standards in this respect, would constitute a 'violation of human
dignity'
For a distinction between the 'social' and 'medical' model of disability, see infra at tn 28.
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private/family life and his home (the option of independent living).22
A further argument on the facts of ex parte Barry could be based upon
Article I of the First Protocol to the ECHR which states that:
'Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions... '
This article has been interpreted to include within its meaning the
provision of a 'welfare benefit' as a 'pecuniary right' once the eligibility criteria
for such benefits (which must also be in accordance with the ECHR) have
been satisfied. 23 In the context of ex parte Barry, it is arguable that as Mr
Barry had previously satisfied the eligibility criteria for disability support
services under s2 CSDPA he should, as a result, be entitled to the provision
of such services as a 'pecuniary right', ie a right within the protective remit of
Article 1 of the First Protocol.
One should note, however, that in defending an action under the ECHR
or its Protocols a State may have recourse to its margin of appreciation; a
concept that is capable of placing a qualification upon the rights contained
therein. On the facts of ex parte Barry, therefore, a government could attempt
to justify the decision as being in the interests of:
'the economic wellbeing of the country (Article 8(2))
and/or
in accordance with [inter alia] the general interest... (Article 1(2) First
Protocol)'
As the decision to discontinue the proVISIOn of disability support
Note that in addition to X and Y, op cit, a direct and immediate link has been found to exist in Airey
v Ireland, 9 October 1979, Series A no 32; Lopez Ostra v Spain (lIlutatis lIll/tandis, 9 Decembcr
1994, Series A no 303-C) and Guerra and Others v Italy, 19 February 1998 (lIlutaiis lIlutandis.
RepOlts of Judgments & Decisions 1998) Common to each of these cases, is the intimacy between
the actJomission in question and the pnvate or family life of the applicanL an intimacy that arguably
existed in Botta.
23 See Gaygl/suz v Austria, 16 September 1996 (39/1995/545/631).
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services in ex parte Barry was essentially based on economic reasoning made
in a climate of limited resources and arguably, therefore, in accordance with
both the 'economic wellbeing of the country' and the 'general interest' of the
nation, the above qualifications may preclude a favourable outcome for Mr
Barry under the Convention. Be that as it may, the margin of appreciation
attributed to a State must always be tempered by 'the circumstances, the
subject matter [of the right in question] and its background'.24 In respect of ex
parte Barry therefore, it is interesting to note the priority given to disability
support services by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in
Recommendation No R (92) 6 on a coherent policy for people with
disabilities. This recommendation states at paragraph 4 under the heading
'General Policy':
'... it is important to ensure that sufficient financial resources are
available in order to overcome the disadvantages affecting people with
disabilities.'
Moreover, at paragraph 1.3 under the heading 'Social, Economic and
Legal Protection', the Recommendation continues:
'Socio-economic protection must be ensured by financial benefits and
social services. This protection must be based on a precise assessment
of the needs and situation of people with disabilities.'
In light of the importance attached by this Recommendation to the
provision of disability benefits and services,25 and the argument that disability
support services - such as that in dispute in ex parte Barry - can and should
24
25
Seelnze v Austria 28 October 1987, Volume 126, Series A, at para 41 Note also that consideration
of the individual interest at issue or the 'nature of the activities involved' will affect the scope of the
margin of appreciation; see in this respect, Dudgeon v The UK, 22 October 1981, Volume 45, Series
A, European Court of Human Rights, at para 52.
Further support in this respect can be found in the preamble to Rule 4 of the UN Standard Rules on
the Equalisation of Opportunities for People with Disabilities (see Part 1) which provides: 'States
should ensure the development and supply ofsuppmt services including assistive devices for persons
with disabilities, to assist them to increase their level ofindependence in their daily living and to
exercise their rights [emphasis added].'
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be provided as ofright,26 a strong counter-argument could be made against a
defence based upon the above qualifications to the rights in the Convention.
Moreover it should also be noted that, as a concept, the State's 'margin of
appreciation' is likely to be given a strict interpretation in the context of those
grounds of discrimination that have been accorded the classification as being
'internationally suspect', a classification that should arguably include disability
(see Part I).
As to the right of non-discrimination in Article 14 ECHR and its
possible application to the facts of ex parte Barry, difficulty exists in
attempting to use this provision in conjunction with the above Articles as it
requires inequality of treatment to be established between individuals or
groups of individuals placed in comparable situations27 Given that the
'services' listed under s2 of the CSDPA are only available to disabled people,
the identification of any 'less favourable treatment' in comparison with a non-
disabled person is clearly problematic.
Article 14 may, however, prohibit discrimination existing between the
various subsets of disabilities and the weight accorded to them in the provision
of disability benefits and support services. Nonetheless, as mentioned above,
the case law under the ECHR indicates that the non-discrimination provision
found in Article 14 of the Convention will only prohibit distinctions that are
not based upon 'reasonable' and 'objective' criteria (the 'justification defence').
Consequently, while the assessment criteria for the provision of such benefits
and services are based upon the 'medical model' of disability28 and arguably,
therefore, grounded upon an 'essentialist' ideology that devalues the lives of
26
2J
28
See in this respect, R Whittle, 'The Question of Resources and the Application of Disability Rights',
6 Health Care Analysis, 1998,3,227.
Sce , Sunday Tillles v UK Series A, Vol 30.
The 'medical' model of disability focuses on the physical or sensory impairments of the individual and
the defmition ofdisability is largely based on that contained in the WHO, Intematianal Classification
a/Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps, Geneva, WHO, 1980. In contrast, the 'social' model
views the existence of disability as stemming from significant barriers in the social and built
environment; see M Oliver, (ed) Social Work: DIsabled People and Disabling Environments,
Jessica Kingsley, London, 1991. One sliould note, however, that the classification provided by the
WHO is cUlTently under revision and early drafts demonstrate a clear recognition of the 'social model'
of disability.
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people with disabilities,29 it is unlikely that the Court of Human Rights would
find it in breach of the Convention given the present format of Article 14.30
Beyond the facts presented in ex parte Barry and the articles discussed
above, it is clear that while each of the remaining articles under the
Convention and its Protocols relate to both able-bodied and disabled people,31
the following provisions are likely to have particular relevance to people with
disabilities:
'No one shall be subject to ...degrading treatment... [Article 3 -emphasis
added].'
It has been held that discrimination based on race may itself amount to
'degrading treatment'32 Potentially, therefore this application of Article 3 may
also extend to include disability-based discrimination.
'Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person [Article 5 -
emphasis addedp3
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to
found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of
this right [Article 12 - emphasis added].
29
30
31
32
33
See in this respect, J Branson and D Miller, 'Beyond Integration Policy - The Deconstruction of
Disability, in L Barton (ed) [ntegration: Myth or Reality?, Falmer, London, 1989.
This point needs to be tackled at both a social and political level. Reliance should not be placed, at
least within the United Kingdom and New Zealand, upon existing domestic legal structures to address
this issue in a satisfactory way. See in this respect, R Whittle, 'The Question of Resources and the
Application of Disability Rights', supra.
See, for example X and Yv the Netherlands, discussed op cit, and Obermeier case, 28 June 1990
(6/1989/166/222). In the latter, it was held that the Disabled Persons Board and Provincial Governor
of Austria did not constitute independent nibunals for the purposes of A1ticle 6( I). The lack of an
effective review of these bodies, therefore, constituted a violation of the right of access to a court
under Article 6(1 ).
East African Asians v UK (1994) 78-A D & R 5, at para 207.
The application ofthe rights protected under the ECHR, in paIticular Article 5, to people with mental
illness is examined in 0 Thorold, 'The Implications of the European Convention on Human Rights
for the United Kingdom Mental Health Legislation, 6 European Human Rights Law Review 1996,
619.
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No person shall be denied the right to education [Article 2, First
Protocol - emphasis added]
Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of free-movement and freedom to
choose his residence [Article 2(1), Fourth Protocol- emphasis added].'
Once incorporated into domestic law, either by national statute (in a
dualist legal system) or by virtue of ratification by the State (in a monist legal
system), the ECHR will provide self-executing rights to individuals within the
territory of a State Party. Disabled individuals within those Contracting States
will therefore be able to enforce their rights under the ECHR before national
courts and tribunals and, in this respect, may refer to relevant national
decisions interpreting the Convention, the Judgments by the Court of Human
Rights, and relevant Convention sources such as the Recommendations and
Resolutions discussed earlier in this paper.
ii. The European Social Charters34
Although binding upon State signatories, the European Social Charter
1961 (ESC 1961) does not provide a facility for individual complaints. The
incorporation of a mere supervisory mechanism (discussed in Part I), while
valuable, will not, on its own, render the treaty accessible to the individual.
Moreover, given that all but one of the rights enshrined within the ESC 1961
are 'non-justiciable' in nature, it is clear that they will not produce self-
executing rights, ie rights enforceable before national courtS. 35 It should be
noted, however, that disability Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in
Contracting States that have signed the 1995 Additional Protocol to the ESC
1961 (providing for a system of collective complaints) are now able to submit
complaints regarding breaches under the ESC 1961 directly to the Committee
34
35
For a brief discussion on the actual and potential impact of both the European Social Chalter 1961
and the European Social Chait"," 1996 (Revised), see A Heringa, Editorial, 4 Maastricht Journal of
European and Comparative Law, 1997,2,107.
Arguably the right to strike under Article 6(4) of the ESC 1961 has self-executing effect.
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ofIndependent Experts (the body presiding over the Charter)36
While the Revised European Social Charter 1996 (ESC(R) 1996)37
incorporates new and more progressive provisions, many of which can be
analysed both in terms of 'civil and political' and 'social and economic' rights,
it does not provide a facility for individual complaints and will not, therefore,
be any more accessible than the ESC 1961. Consequently, the Social Charters
will place little more than a political or moral obligation upon governments
of Contracting States that operate a dualist legal system and have not, at
present, enacted a national statute to incorporate either the ESC 1961 or the
ESC(R) 1996. In this context, therefore, similarities may be drawn with the
non-binding instruments examined in Part I, although it should be noted that
certain provisions of the ESC(R) 1996 are arguably capable of providing self-
executing rights to nationals within those Contracting States operating a
monist legal system; rights that may therefore be pleaded directly before
national courts or tribunals. 38
Encouragement as to the potential future role of the Social Charters in
the sphere of human rights may be gained from various sources that together
indicate an increase in both the profile and possible application of the rights
protected within these Charters. Thus, within the remit of the Council of
Europe, the Court ofHuman Rights has referred to the ESC 1961 - during its
deliberations - in developing the indivisible link between the 'civil and
political rights' protected by the ECHR and the 'social and economic rights'
protected by the ESC 1961 (rights recently expanded in the ESC(R) 1996)39
36
37
38
39
For an examination of the additional protocol to the ESC 1961, see R Brillat, A New Protocol to the
European Social Charter Providing for Collectivc Complaints, 1 European Human Rights Law
Review, 1996,52. At present, the United Kingdom has neither signed nor ratified it
The ESC(R) 1996 entered into force on 1 July 1999. It required at least three ratifications before it
could take effect To date it has received tour ratitications (France, Romania, Slovenia, and Sweden)
and 19 signatures (including the United Kingdom). These State signatories are now Contracting
States to the ESC(R) 1996.
See, for example, the non-discrimination provision in Article E (discussed below).
See for example, Lopez-Ostra, Judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A, vol 303-C and Sigurdur
A SigUlJonsson, judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A, vol 264. It should be noted that these
reterences were made despite the inability of a complainant to invoke the provisions of the ESC 1961
m application proceedings under the ECHR For an interesting discussion concerning the protcction
of social aIld economic rights through trcaties on civil and political rights, sec M Scheinin, Economic
and Social Rights as Legal Rights in A Eide, C Krause and A Rosas (cds) Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: A Textbook, Mm1inus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1994,44-62
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In relation to the European Community, the increasing importance of the ESC
1961 and the growing awareness of a need for a 'social Europe'4o are both re-
enforced in the new fourth paragraph of the Preamble to the Maastricht
Treaty, and manifest in the introduction of a new Chapter IV on Social Policy
in Section II of the Amsterdam Treaty. Together, therefore, with the
justiciable nature of many of the new provisions within the ESC(R) 1996 and
the global recognition of the indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated
nature of both 'social and economic' and 'civil and political' rights,41 these
sources indicate that the Social Charters are likely to playa valuable role in
protecting the rights and interests of disadvantaged social groups - such as
disabled people - in future years.
One apparent limitation of the European Social Charters, however, is
the failure of the non-discrimination provisions in both the ESC 1961 and the
ESC(R) 1996 to expressly include disability within their protective remit42
Thus, the preamble to the ESC 1961 provides:
'the enjoyment of social rights should be secured without discrimination
on grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national
extraction or social origin.'
Moreover, despite being more extensive, the expatiation of the grounds
of discrimination contained in Article E of the ESC(R) 1996 also fails to
specifically include disability within its coverage, thus:
'The enjoyment of the rights set forth in this Charter shall be secured
without discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national extraction or
social origin, health, association with a national minority, birth or other
status. [emphasis added]'
40
41
42
See in this respect, B Bercusson et aI, A Manifesto for Social Europe, 3 European Law Journal,
1997,2,189.
See, The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993.
A similar limitation has previously been identified in respect of Article 26 of the lCCPR and A1ticle
2 (2) of the ICESCR (examined in Part I) and Article 14 ECHR (see above).
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It is likely, however, that this limitation - like that of the non-
discrimination provisions in the other treaties identified above and in Part I -
is more apparent than real. Given that Article E of the ESqR) 1996 is largely
a codification of the understanding that the Committee ofIndependent Experts
has placed upon the non-discrimination principle in the preamble to the ESC
1961, the following points can be made in respect of both Social Charters and
their operation.
The first point is that neither of the non-discrimination provisions in the
Social Charters can be described as autonomous due to the inclusion of the
words 'set forth in this Charter' in Article E of the ESqR) 1996. Equal,
therefore, to the position under Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 2 (2) of
the ICESCR, the non-discrimination provisions in the Social Charters will
only prohibit discrimination in respect of one or more of the other rights
protected within their respective remit of application.
The second point concerns the Annex under Article E of the ESC(R)
1996 which provides:
'A differential treatment based on an objective and reasonable
justification shall not be deemed discriminatory.'
Coupled with the words 'on any grounds such as' within Article E of the
ESqR) 1996, its Annex would therefore suggest that the non-discrimination
provisions within the Social Charters prohibit any distinction on any ground
unless 'an objective and reasonable justification' can be made by the State
concerned. Equal to the interpretation placed upon Article 26 ICCPR and
Article 14 ECHR, the non-discrimination provisions in the Social Charters
would therefore appear to be 'open-ended' and, as a consequence, prohibit
disability-based discrimination unless an objective and reasonable justification
can be established by the defendant State. This Justification defence' would
arguably allow for the introduction of 'affirmative action measures' for groups
- such as disabled people - that have historically suffered from de facto forms
of discrimination. 43
It should be noted however that, prima facie, the non-discrimination
43 lt should be noted that affinnative action measures may also be allowed under the ICESCR's non-
discrimination provision (Article 2(2)) when read in the light of the General Comment on disability
issued by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (see Part I).
20
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
provisions within the Social Charters do not place a positive obligation on
Contracting States to introduce legislation to ensure that the rights protected
by the Social Charters are not violated. This is in contrast, therefore, to the
relevant provisions under both the ICCPR and the ICESCR (discussed in Part
I) and the interpretation that may be placed upon Article 14 ECHR by the
Court of Human Rights (see above).
The third point is that - like Article 14 ECHR and Article 26 of the
ICCPR - it is unclear, at present, whether the right to non-discrimination
within the Social Charters will prohibit 'indirect' forms of discrimination and
whether or not this right would encompass the concept of 'reasonable
accommodation'. A similar statement, therefore, to that made by the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the ICESCR (see
Part I) would provide much needed clarification in this respect.
While the absence of an express inclusion of disability in the non-
discrimination provisions under the ICCPR, the ICESCR (see Part I), the
ECHR and the ESC 1961, arguably reflects the age of these documents,
difficulty exists in extending this justification to the ESC(R) 1996. In the
event that the Committee of Independent Experts adopts a different approach
to that of both the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR and the Court
of Human Rights under the ECHR in not interpreting the non-discrimination
provisions under the Social Charters as being 'open-ended', reliance would
have to be placed upon the non-exhaustive nature of the words 'or other status'
in Article E ofthe ESqR) 1996. These words would therefore leave open the
possible inclusion of 'disability' within the protective remit of the non-
discrimination provisions of both Social Charters. Further encouragement in
this respect may be gained from the commitments contained within the non-
binding instruments pertaining to disability that have emanated from the
Council of Europe (see above).
Alternatively, one should note that the specific reference to the word
'health' in the ESC(R) 1996 can clearly have relevance to people with
disabilities44 albeit limited, prima facie, in its application to matters relating
to the 'medical' model of disability. Moreover, a more purposive interpretation
44 It is the opinion of Wolfgang Peukert (Head of Case-Law and Researeh Unit, European Commission
of Human Rights, Council of Europe, Strasbourg) 'that disability eould undoubtedly be subsumed
under [the terms] health or other status' (letter to author, 3 February 1998).
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of the term 'health' might evolve through decisions by the Committee of
Independent Experts in the light ofthe definition of disability contained within
paragraph 3 of Recommendation 1185 (1992); a definition that is reflective
of the 'social' model of disability, Such an interpretation has already been
provided elsewhere in the context of the term 'health' under Article 12
ICESCR45 and the new Article 137 of the European Community treaties 46
This interpretation extends beyond matters relating to its medical component
and could equally apply to Article E of the ESC (R) 1996, However, if the
non-discrimination provisions within the Social Charters are not considered
to be 'open-ended' it is likely that, until such clarification exists in relation to
the term 'health', the phrase 'or other status' will provide a more appropriate
provision for disabled citizens of State signatories to the Social Charters.
While the remaining provisions under both the ESC 1961 and the ESC
(R) 1996 cover both able-bodied and disabled people within their specific
remit of application,47 the following articles are of particular relevance to the
rights and freedoms of people with disabilities:
ESC 1961 48
The right to vocational guidance (Article 9)
The right to vocational training (Article 10)
The right to social and medical assistance (Article 13)
The right to benefit from social welfare services (Article 14)
The right of physically or mentally disabled persons to vocational
45
46
47
48
See R Whittle, The Question of Resources and the Application of Disability Rights, supra fu 26 at
228.
See R Whittle, Disability Discrimination and the Amsterdam Treaty, 23 European Law Review,
1998, I, 50, at p 55 (published prior to the re-numbering of the Treaty articles). Moreover it is
arguable that, in the light ofthe Amsterdam Treaty, the European Commission can now adopt a more
progressive approach to Community legislation concerning 'health' matters. Such an approach may
be justified through reliance on other terms in the Treaty such as 'quality of life' (Article 2) and 'social
exclusion' (Articles 136 and 137); terms that would certainly encompass Issues relating to disability
benefIts and support services (for example) when used in conjunction with the term 'health'.
With the exception ofArticle 15 under both Social Charters which specifically limits its application
to people with disabilities.
It should be noted that each of the following provisions of the ESC 1961 has been accepted by the
govemment of the United Kingdom.
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training, rehabilitation and social resettlement (Article 15)
The right of the family to social, legal and economic protection (Article
16)
ESC(R) 1996
Disabled persons have the right to independence, social integration and
participation in the life of the Community (Article 15 - amended)49
All workers have the right to dignity at work (Article 26 - new)
Everyone has the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion
(Article 30 - new)
Everyone has the right to housing (Article 31 - new)
Instruments emanating from the European Union
To date there are 15 countries that have signed the European
Community Treaty50 and together constitute the membership of the European
Union. By attributing their sovereign rights in certain fields of policy to the
Community Institutions, each Member State has acknowledged and validated
the existence of a binding and autonomous legal system that transcends State
boundaries and is unique at an international level. In contrast to the other
systems of international law discussed above and in Part I, European
Community law possesses a comprehensive and pervasive monitoring and
enforcement mechanism that is both accessible to the individual and
supported by effective powers of sanction. In this regard, the European Union
is therefore superior to the other international organisations identified
throughout Part I and II of this article.
At the highest level, this monitoring and enforcement mechanism
49
50
Fully in line with the equality of opportunity approach to disability rights, Article 15 is clearly the
most significant provision within the ESqR) 1996 from a disability perspective. It should be noted,
however, that, like a number ofother articles within the Social Charters, Contracting States have the
option as to whether or not they wish to be bound by the obligations that AIticle 15 would impose
upon them.
Treaty ofRome 1957 as amended by the Single European Act 1986, the Treaty on European Union
1992, and the Amsterdam Treaty \997. The Amsterdam Treaty came into force on the 1 May 1999.
Please note that the treaty articles referred to in this section of the paper are based upon the new
numbering system introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam.
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enables the acts and/or omissions of a Community Institution to be reviewed
directly before the European Court of Justice. This process of judicial review
may be initiated at the suit of individuals, groups of individuals, Member
States, or other Community Institutions (Articles 230 and 232). In the light
of the recent amending Treaty of Amsterdam, this ability to review the acts of
the Community Institutions has particular relevance to people with disabilities.
In this respect (as suggested elsewhere) disabled nationals of a Member State
may in the future be able to challenge those Community measures (based upon
Article 95 of the Treaty) that have implications for, but fail to adequately
consider, the needs of disabled people within their design. 51
At another level, a facility exists whereby both the European
Commission and the Member States may eventually take a State Party that is
failing to meet its obligations under Community law before the Court of
Justice (Articles 226 and 227 respectively). The Court of Ju~tice may then
direct the Contracting State to comply with its obligations and may impose a
large cumulative fine as a penalty for its failure to do so (Article 228).
The need to initiate the above monitoring and enforcement mechanisms
will typically arise when the Community Institutions act within their delegated
fields of competence and thereby create or extend existing obligations upon
themselves, Member States, or natural or legal persons. Such action by the
Community Institutions can provide a supreme source of law capable of
furnishing Justiciable' rights to individuals before their national courts.
However, the ability to enforce Community law against a natural or
legal person (as opposed to a State) directly before national courts is restricted
to those measures complying with the requirements to be self-executing (see
Part I). Moreover EC Directives (one form of binding measure) that meet with
those requirements can only be enforced, due to their particular nature, against
the State or emanations thereof. Nevertheless, both Directives and other
forms of Community law that cannot 'directly' be enforced before national
courts against either private parties and/or the State, may still provide the
individual with enforceable rights through an indirect channel. Under the Von
Colson principle, national courts are obliged to construe national law in line
51 See R Whittle, Disability Discrimination and the Amsterdam Treaty, supra. In the light of the ever
increasing profile of human rights within the Community, it would now seem appropriate for the
Court of Justice to interpret the case law requirements for an individual to have sufficient legal
standing to challenge the Community Institutions by judicial review in a less restrictive manner.
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with Community law as far as possible without an undue straining of the
words in a domestic statute. 52 Reliance would therefore be placed upon the
new interpretation of the national statute and, consequently, Community law
would be enforced through the 'backdoor'53 In the context of disability
discrimination (for example) national statutes such as the United Kingdom's
Disability Discrimination Act 1995, the Irish Employment Equality Act 1998
and Equal Status Bill (revised), and the relevant draft legislation in Sweden
and the Netherlands,54 have a clear potential application in this regard.
In practice, the majority of complaints regarding alleged breaches of
Community law are today adequately dealt with by national courts. Moreover,
in the event that national courts are unclear as to the principles or scope of
Community law, the preliminary reference procedure under Article 234 allows
guidance and clarification in this respect to be sought from the Court of
Justice. This facility therefore provides the individual with an indirect access
to the Court of Justice when other direct avenues (such as Articles 230 and
232, above) are not available.
This accessibility, therefore, of the monitoring and enforcement
mechanism (a mechanism ultimately enforceable through the Court of Justice)
contributes to a legal structure that has greater potential than the other forms
of transnational law discussed thus far to impose changes in the laws of
recalcitrant States and to bring about an improvement in the rights and
freedoms of disabled citizens within the European Union. 55
However, while substantial, this potential is limited at present because
the general right to equality under Community law has not yet been extended
to include a prohibition of discrimination based on disability. Although the
Court of Justice has developed human rights protection within its
jurisprudence on the 'general principles' of Community law, such protection
52
53
54
55
Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891.
One should note that a natural or legal person may also claim damages fi'om the State for its failure
either to implement a Community measure, or to implement it correctly; see in this respect Cases C-6
and 9/90 Francavich and Bani/aei v Italy [1991] ECR 1-5357
See in this respect, Sweden's proposed Bill against discrimination in working life on grounds of
disability, and the proposed Bill in the Netherlands on the prohibition of making an unjustifiable
distinction on the grounds of handicap or chronic disease.
A potential that is particularly important in the light of the future enlargement of the Union.
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has not yet encompassed the right to equality of opportunity for this
population group. Nonetheless, despite this current limitation, the prohibition
of discrimination under the existing general right to equality includes both
'direct' and 'indirect' forms of discrimination56 and would also allow
'affirmative action measures' under certain circumstances. 57 A suitable
foundation therefore exists within the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice to
enable an aggressive judicial policy aimed at combating discrimination based
on disability.
First, however, such a policy must be within the scope of the
Community treaties and it is in this context that the amending Treaty of
Amsterdam is most significant. The ability of the Community Institutions to
introduce secondary or delegated legislation on the basis of the primary Treaty
provisions is another important distinction between Community law and the
international instruments and organisations discussed above and in Part 1. In
effect, the adoption of secondary legislation or the development of the general
principle of equality in the context of non-discrimination for people with
disabilities would impose a legal regime in this area of human rights that is
superior to national law; a regime that must then be reflected within the
domestic legal systems of the Member States.
This legislative ability is aptly illustrated by the Article 13 of the Treaty,
which provides a clear legislative basis for the introduction of secondary
legislation to combat, inter alia, disability-based discrimination, thus:
'Without prejudice to the other provisions ofthis Treaty and within the
limits ofthe powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after
56
57
See Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus Gmbh v Weber von Harz [1986] ECR 1607. It is suggested that
any further developments at a Community level - legislative or jurisprudential - in protecting the right
to non-discrimination for people with disabilities should incorporate the test employed in Case C-
237/94 John O'Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR 1-2617 to identify indirect forms of
discrimination~a test more appropriate in combating discrimination on grounds such as disability.
Case 13/63 Italy v Commission [1963] ECR 31, although the uncertainty surrounding the further
development of affirmative action measures at a Community level in the context of human rights is
demonstrated by the recent jurisprudence ofthe Court of Justice (cf Case-C409/95 Hellmut Marshall
v Land Nordrhein-WestJalen with Case C-450/93 E Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen ECR 1-
3051) and the inclusion of a new fourth paragraph in Article 141 (concerning gender discrimination)
by the Amsterdam Treaty. This paragraph merely allows for the introduction of such measures by
Member States under limited circumstances.
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consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or
belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation [emphasis added].'
While the limitations and potential benefits surrounding Article 13 (both
legislative and jurisprudential) have been discussed elsewhere,58
encouragement rimy be gained from obiter dicta in a recent decision by the
Court of Justice. In Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd,59 the
Court, while holding that the treaty - at the time the case was heard - did not
encompass protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation,
purposely left open the possibility of a full equality jurisprudence developing
after the Amsterdam Treaty had come into effect. Given that the Treaty of
Amsterdam has recently come into operation, it is clear that sexual
orientation, and therefore disability and the other grounds of discrimination
listed within Article 13, are now within the scope of the Treaty.
One should note, however, that if the general principle of equality in the
context of human rights is limited to Article 13's remit of application, then,
due to that Article's particular wording, the general principle cannot be
described as being 'open-ended' in nature. This is in contrast, therefore, to the
ICCPR (see Part 1), the ECHR, and the Social Charters. Moreover, as the
grounds of discrimination listed within Article 13 do not conclude with the
words 'or other status' it would also appear that the Community's general
principle of equality, in the context of human rights, cannot be described as
being non-exhaustive in nature. This is in contrast, therefore, with the other
principle binding instruments considered in both Part I and II of this article. 60
In developing the general principle of equality or formulating a
58
59
60
R Whittle, Disability Discrimination and the Amsterdam Treaty, supra. For a discussion conceming
the practical application of Article 13 to people with disabilities in the context of the recent
legislative commitment by the European Commission in respect of non-discrimination, see R Whittle,
(1999) Disability Rights alld the Amsterdam Treaty: the way forward, Annual General Assembly
of the European Disability Forum, Brussels, EDF.
Case C-249/96 (1998) at para 47-48.
Although It should be noted that certain grOlmds of disclimination listed within Article 13, such as
'belief for example, may well be given a purposive interpretation to include matters such as 'political
opinion' The grounds of discrimination listed within A.11icle 13 may, therefore, be more extensive
than they would first appear.
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legislative measure to combat disability-based discrimination, it would be
open to the Court of Justice and the Community Institutions to make reference
to the other international instruments that have a bearing on the rights and
freedoms of disabled people. Thus, the new Article 6 of the Treaty on
European Union (TEU) directs the Court of Justice to refer to both the ECHR
and the constitutional traditions of the Member States in determining what
mayor may not constitute a 'fundamental right'.61 In addition, both the new
fourth paragraph in the Preamble to the Maastricht Treaty and Article 136
encouragingly confirm the Member States' commitment to fundamental social
rights as set out in the ESC 1961 and in the Community Charter of the
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 1989 ('The Community Charter').62
In terms of the Community Charter it is worth noting that, although non-
binding in nature, the majority of Member States have agreed to it and it
therefore constitutes a clear declaration by those States in the context of
workers' rights. Moreover, by establishing certain fundamental principles in
the social arena for workers, the Community Charter has empowered the
European Commission to take appropriate measures in order to both
implement the rights that it enumerates and to prepare annual reports on its
application in the Member States. Furthermore, in providing the basis for the
Agreement on Social Policy, its main provisions63 were effectively
incorporated into Community law via the Treaty's new social provisions, as
amended at Amsterdam. 64 These provisions arguably provide the most
promising basis for the introduction of secondary legislation protecting the
rights and freedoms of people with disabilities, albeit limited in their
61
62
63
64
One should note that an amendment to Article L (now Article 46 of the TEU) by the Amsterdam
Treaty expressly provides jurisdiction to the Court of Justice to review compliance of the acts of the
institutions with Article 6 in so far as it has jurisdiction under the Community Treaties and the revised
Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. Article 46 TEU, as far as the first pillar is concerned,
simply codifies the existing case law position recently confirmed in Case C-299/95, Kremzow v
Austria [1997] ECR 1-2629 The Court's jurisdiction in this respect has particular relevance to a
judicial review action based on Articles 230 and 232, discussed in R Whittle, 'Disability
Discrimination and the Amsterdam Treaty', supra.
Note also that both the ECHR and the European Social Chalier 1961 aloe refened to in the preamble
to the Single European Act 1986.
See B Bercusson, The European Community's Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, 53
Modern Law Review, 1990,624.
See in this respect, Articles 136-45 of the Treaty.
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application to matters ostensibly relating to the concept of 'worker' or the
'working environment'. 65
The Community Charter, therefore, is likely to play an important part
in the furtherance of social policy and law within the Community and this, in
turn, will have a significant bearing on the rights and interests of disabled
citizens of the European Union. Of particular relevance in this respect, Article
26 of the Community Charter provides:
'Whatever the nature of disablement, disabled persons are entitled to
concrete measures to improve their social and occupational
integration, especially vocational training, ergonomics, accessibility,
transport and housing [emphasis added].'
The Treaty references to the ECHR the ESC 1961, and the Community
Charter, clearly underline the existing case law concerning the Treaty and the
application of those international instruments to human rights. One may
therefore extrapolate the inferences that we have made in relation to those
instruments in the context of disability, and place such inferences within a
European Community dimension. However, it remains unclear as to the
extent that the Community Institutions can employ the instruments ofglobal
international law (GIL) - discussed in Part I - in developing Community
jurisprudence or legislative action in the field of equality of opportunity.66
There appears no reason in principle for restricting the Community
Institutions, when seeking guidance in this respect, to refer only to those
documents emanating from the Council of Europe. At the very least, it is
arguable that the phrase 'constitutional traditions of Member States' contained
in the new Article 6 of the TEU would also include those elements under GIL
that may be considered as 'customary international law'. In this regard, and in
terms of disability rights, encouragement can be gained from the recent non-
binding instruments emanating from both the European Commission and the
65
66
See R Whittle, Disability Discrimination and the Amsterdam Treaty, supra.
Reference was made to the lCCPR by the Court of Justice in Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South-West
Trains Ltd, op cit, at paras 43-47.
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Council of the European Union67 endorsing the application of UN Standard
Rules on the Equalisation of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities
(discussed in Part I of this article).
Conclusions
This two-part article has aimed to demonstrate that while there is, at
present, no single human rights instrument constituting a binding, accessible
and self-executing measure in the context of disability rights, there does exist
a complex, though workable, transnational legal framework through which
such an instrument may evolve. A progressive measure in this regard would,
we suggest, encompass both civil and political, and social and economic rights
that are self-executing in nature. Such an instrument would be further
enhanced if accompanied by appropriate affirmative action measures.
The process involved in developing such an instrument will require,
inter alia, a comprehensive understanding and recognition of the existing
potential of transnational law in both the protection and further advancement
of disability rights. This two part-article has sought to contribute to that
understanding. In this respect, the concluding remarks made in relation to the
relevant instruments of global international law (GIL) in Part I are equally
applicable to those of European international law (ElL) considered here in
Part II. We emphasise again, therefore, the importance of national and
international NGOs vigorously pursuing the supervisory, and where
appropriate, the enforcement mechanisms of such instruments, and we also
stress the practical utility of those provisions (within binding international
measures) that are self-executing in nature.
As a system of law, it would appear that European Community law
holds greater promise for disabled citizens of Europe than the instruments that
have emanated from the Council of Europe to date (see above) and those
considered under GIL in Part 1. It clearly provides the most appropriate
international system for both the promotion and the policing of a
67 See in this respect the Commission's Conununication on equality ofopportunity for people with
disabilities - a new European Community disability strategy (1996) Com 406 final and Council
Resolution on equality ofopportunity for people with disabilities. 1996. (97/C 12(01). OJ C 12 Vol
40 13 January 1997
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comprehensive legislative package in this respect within the European region;
a package that has the greatest potential to be translated into national law and
policy.68 The recent amendments to the treaties of the European Community
by the Amsterdam Treaty provide a clear and encouraging step in this
direction.
In the context of non-discrimination, it is submitted that a focus should
be placed upon the economic dimension of the Community and the
importance that it attaches to regulating the common market. It is this
importance that has provided the catalyst for the development of those factors
that distinguish European Community law from the other systems of
international law considered throughout Part I and II of this article. Given that
equality of opportunity and non-discrimination underpin, rather than
undermine market rationality, we suggest that it is this dimension that should
be harnessed by disability NGOs in Europe. In this respect, it is clear that the
existence of discrimination limits both competition and the growth of
economic markets and that these markets will, in the absence of regulation,
continue to discriminate.69 Moreover, added 'Community value' in the context
of the labour market, tax revenues, welfare costs and consumer activity would
also accrue from the implementation of effective measures combating
discrimination. European disability NGOs should therefore focus on these
benefits when lobbying at both a national and international level for
Community intervention to combat disability-based discrimination.
That is not to ignore, however, the individual potential of those GIL and
ElL instruments that have emanated from organisations external to the
European Community. As demonstrated throughout Part I and II of this
article, these instruments may conceivably playa significant role in the further
advancement of the rights and freedoms of disabled people. We stress,
68
69
The signilieanee of this potential is particularly apparent when one considers that if Community
action in the area of disability rights took a progressive stance towards the concept of 'reasonable
accommodation' (lor example), it would effectively overtum the recent decision by the Irish Supreme
Court which prevented the adoption of Ireland's 'Employment Equality' and 'Equal Status' Bills
proposed during 1997. See in this respect, In the matter Article 26 ofthe Constitution ofIreland
ond ill the Matter ofthe Employment Equality Bill, Judgment of the Supreme Court, 15 May 1997.
Given that both Bills had attracted cross-party support favouring their adoption, it is unlikely that the
Irish Government would react in a negative manner towards a legislative proposal from the European
Commission in this regard.
See in this respect, C Sunstein, 'Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination', 8 Soc Phil and Pol, 1991,
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therefore, that any further development at Community level (legislative or
jurisprudential) in combating disability discrimination should not proceed
without a full appreciation of all relevant GIL and ElL instruments protecting
human rights. Clearly the campaigning vitality and intelligent advocacy of
international disability organisations and NGO pressure groups will
undoubtedly playa vital role in this regard. Disability NGOs have already
served to enhance the visibility of international law and to underline its
potential as a force to regulate and further develop human rights in this area.
One positive outcome of their continued advocacy and lobbying across both
GIL and ElL contexts may well be the recognition, in the near future, of
disability discrimination being classified as 'internationally suspect'; a
classification that would then be in line with the other well-recognised
grounds of discrimination such as race and gender.
In the light of the developing global recognition of the n~ed to combat
disability-based discrimination in recent years, it is likely that transnational
law, and European Community law in particular, will form a key element in
pushing forward the positive frontiers of equality in the years to come. The
time is now ripe for disability NGOs to exploit that potential.
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